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Banking on Ordoliberalism? Security, Stability and Profits in EU’s 
Economic Reform Promotion in Egypt 
 
Word count: 8,715 words 
 
Abstract. The framing of EU-promoted economic reforms in Egypt has been heavily 
influenced by ordoliberal ideas and practices, which have in turn affected how the EU 
interprets security and stability in the economy. This is especially visible in the EU 
promotion of banking sector regulations. Despite the change in approach heralded in the 
post-uprisings EU documents, this paper finds that what we see is only a minor reframing of 
the ordoliberal template, which aims at becoming more inclusive especially drawing in 
small and medium enterprises. However, in light of fast changing circumstances, this 
supposedly new approach has not achieved its stated aims, but indeed something close to its 
opposite, that is: less engagement with a narrower range of actors. 
Keywords: ordoliberalism; EU-Egypt; economic reforms; banking regulation; security; 
stability 
 
 
Introduction 
Despite its weight in terms of the sheer amount of resources devoted to it, the economic 
channel of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation has been somewhat neglected, with the majority 
of the literature focusing on the tensions and contradictions between promoting democracy 
and preserving stability in the region (Pace et al., 2009; Cavatorta and Pace, 2010).1 This 
neglect is even more visible with respect to the financial and the banking sector, as aid and 
trade have historically featured much more prominently in the Euro-Mediterranean agenda. 
This paper addresses this empirical gap with reference to EU-Egypt relations, and contends 
that a focus on the EU’s promotion of financial sector reforms, and more specifically banking 
regulation,2 provides a best-case scenario for the EU to change its policy without incurring 
particularly high costs. This is so for two reasons. Firstly, finance is a sector to which 
historically the EU has devoted limited material resources, and thus one in which sunk costs 
of engagement with Egypt along a specific path are relatively low. Secondly, despite this 
limited material commitment, the Egyptian banking sector has seen the increased 
penetration of EU-based banks. Thus, accepting a change in disposition by post-uprisings 
regimes while retaining access for EU-based companies to the Egyptian banking sector 
would have had relatively little material costs for the EU. 
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While these factors indicate limited constraints to policy change, this paper 
demonstrates that the thrust of the economic reforms promoted by the EU, in the financial 
sector and beyond, has changed only at the margins. Indeed, through its emphasis on 
‘inclusive’ growth and  engagement with more actors, be they civil society organisations 
(CSOs) or small and medium enterprises (SMEs), the new approach to the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) – inaugurated by the March 2011 Partnership for Democracy and 
Shared Prosperity (PfDSP) – has moved towards deepening and broadening the scope of 
application of the same economic template. This is perhaps nowhere clearer than in the chief 
economic goal of establishing a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), which 
verbally encapsulates the EU’s intention of deepening (Deep) and broadening 
(Comprehensive) the move towards free trade that had been at the heart of economic reform 
promotion since the mid-1990s (Martin, 2004). 
This remarkable resilience in the EU framing of economic reforms in general, and with 
specific reference to the banking sector, is yet to be adequately accounted for. Providing 
such an account is the main task of this paper, which relies on qualitative analysis of 
documents and policies on the one hand and on the other hand on elite interviews 
conducted with relevant stakeholders, encompassing officials in the Egyptian government, 
the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE), the EU delegation to Egypt, the European Central Bank 
(ECB), international financial institutions (IFIs), as well as representatives of a sample of 
both public and private sector banks operating in Egypt. The material is presented as 
follows. The first section examines the EU’s economic reform promotion activities under 
Mubarak, and how these were shaped by a specific understanding of the security-stability 
nexus assessed in this special issue (see Introduction). It is suggested that the amelioration of 
traditional security concerns had led the EU to interpret security in both economic and 
ontological terms, and to equate stability with the stability of the Mubarak regime. This is 
specifically illustrated with reference to the EU programme assisting the CBE in the creation 
of a regulatory framework ensuring the compliance of the Egyptian banking sector with 
Basel II regulations. The second section looks at the extent to which the EU framing of 
security and stability with respect to economic relations has changed in the wake of the 
uprisings. While aiming to broaden engagement through reliance on a larger set of tools, the 
new policy approach enshrined in the PfDSP and subsequent ENP-related documents is 
understood as the deepening and broadening of the pre-existing ordoliberal template. The 
third section explores the causes of the limited success of this approach, with specific 
reference to the role of contextual factors. Three of them are of greater importance here: the 
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negative spillover effects that the Eurozone crisis has had for the EU reputation and power 
projection; the momentous transformations experienced by Egypt since 2011; and a changed 
regional environment, especially visible in the increased activism of Gulf countries. It is 
argued that the EU neglect for these fast changing circumstances in favour of ideological 
consistency led a supposedly richer and more inclusive approach to less engagement, and of 
a lower quality, with a narrower range of Egyptian actors. This argument contributes to the 
broader special issues in two significant ways. On the one hand, it shows how greater 
intentions of engagement deriving from the reframing of the security-stability nexus need 
not entail more engagement in practice, in this specific instance also because of factors 
beyond the EU’s control. On the other hand, it also suggests that change with respect to 
broadening engagement does not equate change in overall direction of travel that the EU 
envisages for its economic relations with Egypt. 
 
Between security and profits: EU’s economic reform promotion in Egypt under Mubarak 
By the time the ENP was launched, Egypt appeared in an ideal position for the EU to focus 
on a more economic and ontological understanding of security (see Special Issue 
Introduction), which could in turn be more easily combined with the quest for stability and 
prosperity not only in Egypt but in the broader Southern Mediterranean region. Three main 
developments had made traditional security a domain in which the EU could take for 
granted the cooperation of the Egyptian regime, thus opening the space for a stronger focus 
on economic issues. Firstly, since the recognition of Israel enshrined in the 1978 Camp David 
accords, and even more strongly since its participation in the 1990 Gulf War, the Egyptian 
leadership had demonstrated its loyalty on foreign policy matters. Thus, discrepancies in 
foreign policy orientation could largely be factored out 
Secondly, a change of the guard within the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) 
led between 2002 and 2004 to the rise of a new faction (Collombier, 2006), coalescing around 
Mubarak’s president Gamal, with ‘very liberal’ economic views.3 In light of their outward-
orientation as well as their links with the international business community, once this self-
styled ‘reformist’ group gained prominence within party, parliament and cabinet (Soliman, 
2011), it began to reform the economy along the lines long promoted by IFIs as well as main 
donors and partners such as the EU (Roccu, 2013). This created a clear interlocutor within 
the regime that shared the parameters of the neoliberal discourse to which the EU also 
subscribed. 
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Finally, economic cooperation had been made much easier by a clear division of 
labour between the EU and IFIs. As put before the 2011 revolution by a World Bank official, 
within this division of labour the EU would be ‘doing what it does best’: creating regulatory 
and institutional capacity.4 This focus on regulation and institutions is emblematic of the 
distinctiveness of the EU approach to promote reforms along a neoliberal template 
compared to other major international actors. This distinctiveness revolves around two key 
elements. On the one hand, a gradualist approach to economic reforms, as opposed to the 
‘shock therapy’ promoted by IFIs in Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s (Kolodko, 
2000). On the other hand, more than the idealtypical neoliberalism of the Chicago School 
usually associated with Thatcher and Reagan, the EU approach to economic reforms has 
been very much informed by German ordoliberalism. This rejects the vision of the market as 
a spontaneous order to be left to its own devices, and instead conceptualises the market as a 
fragile social convention, to be fostered and protected through state power (Bonefeld, 2012; 
Gerber, 1994). Thus, the EU’s practice and self-framing as a regulatory power (Majone, 1996; 
Menz, 2003), opposed to the excesses of deregulation in the Anglosphere, had increasingly 
been accepted by IFIs, other main donors and developing countries’ governments, providing 
it with a specific remit within which it could propose genuinely distinctive reforms.5 
In light of these transformations, the EU articulation of the security-stability nexus (see 
Special Issue Introduction) in its economic relations with Egypt had three tightly interwoven 
defining features. Firstly, stability was largely perceived in political terms, and more 
specifically as the stability of the Mubarak regime, given its loyalty and its effectiveness in 
serving the EU’s perceived interests (Pace, 2009). To a large extent, the EU embraced the 
framing on the part of the Egyptian regime, which presented itself as necessary for the EU to 
achieve its goals not only in the country, but in the wider Southern Mediterranean region. 
Secondly, this regime stability was perceived as the best way of ensuring the security and 
profitability of investments conducted in Egypt by EU-based firms. Thus, security was 
largely understood in economic terms, with the interests of EU-based firms operating in 
Egypt taking a prominent role. Thirdly, this pursuit of profits and market shares for EU-
based companies had to avoid undermining the regime stability on which it was predicated. 
Hence, the gradual approach to reforms, and the emphasis on providing state institutions 
with adequate tools for managing a more open and competitive economy, can be 
understood as key ingredients of the EU’s economic reform promotion in Egypt. This 
extension to the neighbourhood of an approach to reforms tried and tested internally 
(Gerber, 1998; Ryner, 1998) could also be couched in terms of ontological security (Mitzen, 
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2006), as it allows the EU to influence neighbouring countries in a way that is consistent with 
the EU’s economic self-image (Damro, 2012; Parker & Rosamond, 2013). 
Informed by this specific framing of the security-stability nexus (see Special Issue 
Introduction), the EU’s ordoliberal approach to reform promotion emphasises two elements. 
On the one hand, as mentioned above, it aims to enhance the regulatory capacity of 
neighbouring states, providing support for the establishment of regulatory authorities and 
frameworks in different sectors. One major consequence of this is that, within the broader 
parameters of the ENP, EU’s economic cooperation with Egypt has largely taken a sectoral, 
as opposed to comprehensive, focus. On the other hand, in line with IFIs’ expectations, these 
regulatory instruments are geared towards fostering an open and competitive environment. 
Consequently, EU-promoted regulations were by and large market-oriented.  
Both elements are in full display in the EU-Egypt cooperation on the reform of 
banking supervision aiming at making the Egyptian banking sector fully compliant with 
Basel II regulations. Here, the EU efforts are nested into a much broader drive towards 
transforming the Egyptian financial sector on neoliberal terms. Financial sector reforms 
undertaken in the 2000s included the divestment of the vast majority of state-owned shares 
in Egyptian banks (World Bank, 2006: 11, ft. 10), the privatisation of one of the ‘big four’ 
public sector banks,6 and other reforms affecting corporate governance and lending practices 
under the aegis of the World Bank, which extended three Financial Sector Development 
Policy Loans amounting to a total of $1.5 billion between 2006 and 2010. 
Within this context, the EU funded two projects to be carried out by the ECB and 
seven member states’ central banks in cooperation with their Egyptian counterpart, the 
CBE.7 The first (MEDA I, 2006-08) focused nearly exclusively on capacity-building missions, 
including the establishment of a task force within CBE focusing on Basel II-related issues 
only. Through the second project (MEDA II, 2009-11), this task force drafted a  regulatory 
framework compliant with Basel II provisions (European Central Bank, 2008).8 The key 
challenge in this respect was identified in the move from a compliance-based to a risk-based 
regulatory regime, entailing a change in the regulatory focus from the rules to be followed to 
the assessment of the amount of risk held by individual actors in the financial sector.9 
This is a vivid example of the EU tendency to present specific reforms in highly 
technical, and as a consequence apolitical, terms (Radaelli, 1999; Kurki, 2011). However, 
some of the implications of the proposed regulatory reforms are extremely political. For 
instance, the whole Basel II approach, having been designed by advanced economies for 
advanced economies,10 can prove problematic when extended to developing countries with 
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relatively underdeveloped banking sectors, as it neglects key sources of vulnerability 
(Griffith-Jones, 2007; see also Kourtelis contribution for similar patterns in agriculture). A 
number of these have been verified in the Egyptian case, such as for instance an overall 
reduction in credit levels, a reinforcement in the pro-cyclicality of lending practices, and a 
strong disincentive to lend to small and medium enterprises (SMEs) (Herrera et al., 2012). 
Beyond its systemic shortsightedness revealed by the 2007-8 financial crisis (Haldane & 
May, 2011), the shift towards a regulatory framework assessing the amount of risk held by 
individual banks means that regulatory authorities are now expected to act in the last 
instance. Through the neglect of some of the peculiarities of the Egyptian banking sector, 
and through entrenching a very specific policy direction, the EU-promoted reforms in 
banking regulation appear geared towards serving a goal that had already been pursued in 
other sectors. In the words of an EU official, this goal was ‘to attract as much EU investment 
in the sector as possible’, to the point of suggesting that ideally local regulators would ‘copy 
and paste’ EU regulation, in order to create a business environment as close as possible to 
that faced at home by EU companies.11 In this respect, as much as they were driven by 
specific norms favouring an open financial sector, the EU-promoted regulatory reforms in 
banking were clearly also aimed at serving the EU perceived interests. 
Regulatory reforms in banking are interesting also for the method in which they were 
promoted, and thus for the forms of engagement privileged by the EU. Contrary to most 
other sectors, in finance the EU does not have much of a carrot to offer, for instance in terms 
of market access. Additionally, the two MEDA programmes combined for a total of about 
€7.5 million (Al-Ahram weekly, 2008), hardly a sizeable material incentive. Thus, much more 
than in other sectors discussed in this special issue, the EU promotion of reforms was 
heavily reliant on discursive means of engagement. These took two main forms. On the one 
hand, there were efforts of a largely argumentative nature through which the EU attempted 
to persuade the counterpart of the benefits of risk-based regulation for the competitiveness 
of the banking sector, as evidenced in the discussion papers produced by the CBE task force 
throughout MEDA II.12 On the other hand, discursive engagement also takes the form of 
institutional cooperation and training programmes, such as the one between central banks, 
aiming at both knowledge transfer and the broader socialisation of CBE task force officials. 
This was complemented by a series of meetings including ‘a sample of Egyptian banks, the 
Capital Markets Authority, Egyptian legal and external audit firms, the Egyptian Banking 
Association, and the Egyptian Banking Institute’.13 Additionally, the CBE task force would 
lead domestic working groups aimed at disseminating knowledge and best practices among 
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‘a significant sample of Egyptian banks and other stakeholders’.14 Thus, EU’s engagement 
was both selective and hierarchical, with most of its efforts being devoted to cooperation 
with the CBE task force, while delegating to the latter relations with banks operating in 
Egypt, which in turn led to the neglect of smaller and specialised banks, non-bank financial 
intermediaries as well as SMEs aiming to gain better access to finance.15 
Hence, taking advantage of a propitious conjuncture, since the mid-2000s the EU 
began to promote consistently its own variety of neoliberalism, centred on gradualism and 
re-regulation aimed at fostering competitive markets. In the economic sphere, security was 
by and large understood as the security of investments by EU-based companies, to be 
achieved through the ordoliberal reforms that the EU had itself undergone, thus also 
creating a higher degree of ontological security. The pursuit of these objectives was 
predicated on the stability of the Mubarak regime, perceived as the main interlocutor. In 
light of its technical-sectoral approach to reform, the EU engaged with a narrow range of 
local actors, relying mostly on discursive forms of engagement. 
 
More of the same? Redefining security and stability in the economy after the revolution 
In its unexpectedness, the 2011 revolution triggered a process of soul-searching among 
external actors involved in Egypt. The EU was no exception in this respect. In the documents 
issued in the aftermath of the uprisings, the solution was identified in a change in the overall 
method of engagement, going on the one hand for the ‘more for more’ approach and on the 
other hand for a much more inclusive approach to reform. In terms of content, however, the 
proposal of a DCFTA suggests that the diagnosis was not that economic reforms had been 
socially counterproductive, but rather that they had not gone far enough. Thus, the EU 
framing of the security-stability nexus was subject only to very minor revisions, which in 
turn entailed a significant broadening of its scope. This section suggests that this minor 
reframing is the function of two elements. On the one hand, the technical-sectoral approach 
to cooperation militates against appreciating the interconnections across fields of social 
activity, and thus the negative externalities of many reforms promoted, including those 
related to banking sector regulation. On the other hand, the expansion of the same reform 
template, if with some tinkering at the margins, represents an instance in the process of ‘fail 
forward’ (Peck, 2010), whereby the limitations of a round of neoliberal reforms are 
addressed through a deepening of the same process, this time aimed at including a broader 
range of social and economic actors. 
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The mass protests in January 2011, eventually leading to the overthrow of Mubarak on 
11 February, appeared to have put in doubt all the key elements of the EU articulation of the 
security-stability nexus in the economic sphere. The regime perceived as ideally positioned 
to secure the EU interests proved unexpectedly brittle, with the Mubarak family and its 
associates being prosecuted first by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) and 
then by the government appointed by Mohamed Morsi, expression of the Muslim 
Brotherhood and first democratically elected president in Egyptian history. In addition to 
major changes at the top of the political system, another layer of political instability was 
brought about by the infighting between and within branches of the Egyptian state (Teti & 
Gervasio, 2013). Additionally, the crisis in which the revolution plunged the Egyptian 
economy, and the ensuing uncertainty, suggest that the security of investments and 
activities of EU-based companies was also at risk. To compound this situation, the Islamist 
turn effected by the Muslim Brotherhood provided reasons for concern, as it was perceived 
both as step back from the secular guarantees in place under Mubarak and as a possible 
threat to the foreign policy trajectory consistently followed before the uprisings.  
While this last concern did not appear particularly founded, as the Freedom and 
Justice Party scrambled to gain international legitimacy (Stacher, 2012), all of these 
transformations in Egypt and the broader Mediterranean region could have led to a 
rethinking of the EU approach to promoting economic reforms. Indeed, such a change in 
approach was what the EU announced to be launching, firstly with the March 2011 PfDSP 
(European Commission, 2011a), followed in May by the ENP review (European 
Commission, 2011b). The changed approach was encapsulated in the ‘more for more’ 
formula, aimed at rewarding with more resources the countries more committed to reforms. 
In terms of the material mechanisms for engagement, the new approach implied stronger 
positive conditionality, aimed at complementing the threat of negative conditionality on 
which the ENP had been hitherto based (European Commission, 2011a: 6). This call for 
differentiation implicitly acknowledged that the ENP had failed to take into adequate 
account the specific needs of individual partners. In this regard, the redirection of the ENP 
would have two further implications. On the one hand, it would incentivise reform 
ownership from partner countries (European Commission and High Representative, 2013: 
16), thus making greater allowances for the different views that might emerge from a more 
open debate in partner countries. On the other hand, the new approach aims at being more 
inclusive, with respect to both its objectives, with a repeated emphasis on ‘inclusive’ growth 
and economic development, and the range of actors engaged. This means for instance 
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lending more importance to CSOs in general and SMEs on economic issues (European 
Commission, 2011b: 4, 7, 14).  
The substantive novelty of the EU approach to the Southern Mediterranean in the 
wake of the Arab uprisings has been scathingly questioned in the literature (Colombo and 
Tocci, 2012; Teti, 2012; Teti et al., 2012). With reference to the articulation of the security-
stability nexus in the economic sphere, material transformations in Egypt and alleged 
transformations in policy approach have led to minor revisions of the EU ordoliberal 
framing. For instance, the threat to the security and profitability of investments conducted 
by EU-based companies made the EU a strong advocate of the need for political stability, 
with trade and investment as ‘engines for growth’ through which political stability can be 
ensured (European Commission, 2011a: 8). However, the latter is now broadened beyond 
regime stability, with an emphasis on ‘deep democracy’, entailing free and fair elections, 
freedom of association and speech, the rule of law as well as reformed security and police 
forces (European Commission, 2011b: 3). Indeed, this element in the EU interpretation of 
security-stability nexus has genuinely changed. Simultaneously, the emphasis on terms such 
as ‘deep’ and ‘inclusive’ appears to signal the EU’s intention of enlarging the scope of its 
intervention, through ‘more ambitious political and economic reforms’ (European 
Commission, 2011a: 2). This entails scaling up its material commitment, as well as engaging 
with a broader set of actors, as highlighted also by Kourtelis with reference to agriculture. 
Despite this partial adaptation, the substantial continuity in the EU framing of the 
stability-security nexus in the economy is perhaps most visible in its understanding of the 
contribution of economic factors to the revolution. The ‘unequal distribution of wealth’ is the 
first factor listed in the PfDSP, but is immediately followed by ‘insufficient social and 
economic reform, limited job creation, weak education and training systems that do not 
produce the skills required in the labour market’ (European Commission, 2011a: 7). The 
economic reforms conducted are thus presented not as heading in the wrong direction, but 
rather as ‘insufficient’, as if more thorough economic reforms would have avoided the levels 
of inequality central to the demands of the Egyptian revolution (Abdelrahman, 2015). This 
diagnosis is immediately confirmed by reference to the faults of both supply and demand in 
the labour market, presented as an objective entity that other policies should aim to serve. 
Coherently with this view, the PfDSP suggests that the demands raised through the 
uprisings ‘can only be addressed through faster and more ambitious political and economic 
reforms’ (European Commission, 2011a: 2). The EU’s proposal of a DCFTA follows along the 
same trail. The same fundamental idea – i.e.: free trade – is to be pursued through a process 
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of both deepening (‘deep’) and broadening (‘comprehensive’). In addition to this general 
neoliberal understanding presenting ever-greater economic integration as a panacea, the 
ordoliberal dimension is also retained, more specifically through highlighting the 
importance of a ‘sound regulatory framework’ (European Commission, 2011a: 7). 
This very partial reframing is the result of two factors, one retrospective and one 
prospective. On the one hand, the EU analysis of the economic causes of the Arab uprisings 
is significantly shaped by its technical-sectoral approach to cooperation. This is apparent 
with reference to the perception of banking sector regulations. From a strictly sectoral 
perspective, this programme appears to have been rather successful, and has been perceived 
as such by the EU (European Central Bank, 2012), as the Egyptian banking sector is Basel II 
compliant since 2013. However, the same cannot be said for the effects of banking sector 
reforms on the real economy. Even before the revolution highly skewed access to finance 
had been identified as a major issue in the functioning of the reformed financial sector 
(Osman, 2010; Roll, 2010; World Bank, 2008). This trend was actually worsened by the full 
range of reforms implemented, including EU-promoted banking sector regulations (Herrera 
et al., 2012). This in turn contributed to increasing levels of inequality, recently accepted 
even by World Bank officials as one of the triggers of the revolution, more specifically in the 
form of a shrinking middle class (Dang & Ianchovichina, 2016). On their own part, the 
revolts to which these reforms contributed jeopardised the political stability at the heart of 
the EU’s strategy for ensuring its security, not only in the economic and ontological 
dimension outlined earlier, but also in its more traditional meaning, as discussed in the next 
section. 
On the other hand, the EU’s insistence on the same brand of market-centred reforms 
can be functional to the next iteration of neoliberal restructuring, following the process of 
‘fail forward’ examined by the geographer Jamie Peck (2010). As neoliberal reforms are 
bound to fall short of the promises made by neoliberal theory, ‘their manifest inadequacies 
have […] repeatedly animated further rounds of neoliberal invention’ (ibid: 6). Here, the 
resonance with the EU’s intensified push for the same fundamental objective of greater 
liberalisation in goods and services is apparent (European Commission, 2011a: 9). Rather 
than questioning the overall thrust of the economic reforms promoted, attention has focused 
on how corruption had perverted the course of otherwise well-designed policies. From this 
perspective, ‘the problem resided not in neoliberalism as a model, but in a corrupted 
implementation of neoliberalism’ (Joya, 2016: 10). Perhaps in light of this perceived failings of 
Egyptian institutions, and the reality of few cronies appropriating the benefits of reforms 
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(Adly, 2010), the EU approach after the uprisings aims at including SMEs, given a more 
prominent role since the PfDSP. As much as a recalibration, this can also be understood as 
yet another expansion in the scope of applicability of neoliberal reforms, from the 
transformation of economic relations of the Washington Consensus, to that of the 
institutional set-up typical of the good governance agenda (Rodrik, 2006), now towards the 
transformation of society at large.16 In the financial sector, this ‘outreach’ duties were 
delegated to the European Investment Bank (EIB), which in the wake of the Arab uprisings 
launched the Risk Capital Facility, explicitly aiming to ‘provide access to equity and debt 
financing to SMEs in the Mediterranean region’ through private equity finance, 
microfinance initiatives and technical assistance.17 Given the possibility it provides for 
companies to acquire equity stakes in Egyptian SMEs, this approach is also meant to 
facilitate EU-based investment.  
Thus, the EU’s changed approach towards Southern Mediterranean and Egypt has 
some genuinely new aspects. However, these are largely functional to the intensification of 
the process begun before the uprisings. It is certainly true that form is also content, and for 
instance greater engagement with SMEs provides the EU with a better grasp of issues 
surrounding access to credit than talking to banks only, as it was the case before the 
revolution. One could then make the broader case that greater engagement of a higher 
quality with more local actors can provide the EU with a wider range of views to take into 
account when formulating its policies and with a wider range of instruments to make these 
policies effective. However, from the very post-Arab uprisings documents, it is apparent 
that the EU had little intention to alter the general direction of travel in the economy, if not 
towards its broadening and deepening. 
 
It takes two to tango: drifting towards ever more selective engagement? 
Despite the alleged potential of the new approach to the ENP, Egyptian governments since 
the revolution have exhibited a distinctly limited interest in deepening engagement with the 
EU, especially when compared to the Mubarak era. This is undoubtedly affected by 
changing circumstances domestically and regionally, as well as by the negative effects of the 
sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone on EU power projection. This section shows that 
particularly under Sisi the Egyptian government has moved towards a transactional 
approach to relations with the EU. The new regime thus cooperates on matters of mutual 
concern, for instance pertaining to migration and to opposition to Daesh/Islamic State, but 
is much less amenable to persuasion on economic reforms. Thus, the clash between the EU’s 
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insistence on its ordoliberal recipes and the new approach from the Egyptian leadership 
within a changed regional context have led the EU’s supposedly more inclusive approach to 
reforms on a path of less engagement and with a narrower range of less positively 
predisposed local actors.  
With the exception of the first phase of the Morsi presidency, Egyptian governments 
following the 2011 revolution have all been less than enthusiastic to engage with the EU on 
the new terms set out in the PfDSP. In 2011, the transitional SCAF administration expressed 
its unwillingness to deepen engagement with the EU on the DCFTA as well as on the 
Dialogue for Mobility, Migration and Security (European Commission, 2012: 3). The Morsi 
presidency began with a mutual commitment to much closer cooperation, enshrined in the 
joint conclusions of the first EU-Egypt task force meeting, which hailed the start of ‘a new 
era in the relationship between the EU and the new Egypt’, grounded in ‘solid co-
ownership’ (EU-Egypt task force, 2012: 1). However, in addition to concerns about the 
authoritarian tendencies of the new regime, the 2012 ENP memo lamented that ‘[i]n the area 
of trade, very few developments took place’, while ‘[n]egotiations on the liberalisation of 
services and establishment made no progress, and the preparatory process for the Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Area with Egypt has yet to be launched’ (European Commission, 
2013: 2). This stall on the DCFTA and more generally on the economic channel of the ENP 
has continued after the coup, leading to the extension of the old Action Plan instead of the 
negotiation of a new one (EEAS-European Commission, 2015). 
This reluctance to deepen engagement on the part of successive post-uprisings 
governments does not have to do exclusively with the EU’s changed approach. Indeed, one 
could argue that the main reasons for this positioning are not directly related to the EU. On 
the domestic scale, polarisation within the Egyptian polity and society have seen the 
resurfacing of repression since the July 2013 coup (Beinin & Duboc, 2015). A reaction to this 
has been the drive towards a further centralisation of external relations. While largely 
independent of the EU, this development clashes with the EU intentions of engaging with a 
wider range of local stakeholders. On the regional scale, post-uprisings Egypt has become a 
much coveted prize for increasingly assertive regional powers. This is visible firstly in the 
preferential relations with Turkey and Qatar established under Morsi (Ayata, 2015; Khatib, 
2013), and then in the financial support that Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Kuwait 
have provided after the coup.18 The indirect implication of this for the EU is that, compared 
to the past, Egyptian governments can now obtain support from a wider range of partners. 
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If these external developments have in themselves decreased the short-term leverage 
of the EU in its relations with Egypt, this trend is compounded by issues pertaining more 
directly to the EU. For instance, the sovereign debt crisis with the Eurozone has clearly 
damaged the EU’s reputation as an effective regulator of its financial and banking sectors, 
particularly relevant for the case study considered here. Combined with domestic and 
regional transformations, this helps explain why the EU’s reframing of its relations with 
Egypt failed to find enough supporters among Egyptian elites. 
Instead, especially under Sisi, the approach chosen by the Egyptian government vis-à-
vis the EU is characterised by two elements. On the one hand, the new regime has succeeded 
in using two bargaining cards to its advantage. Firstly, the Egyptian leadership has gained 
the plaudits of the international community for its ‘pivotal role in brokering a ceasefire in 
the Gaza strip in August 2014’ (European Commission, 2015: 9). Secondly, it has also 
succeeded in presenting itself as a bulwark against Daesh/Islamic State and more generally 
Islamist terrorism. In light of its cooperation on security and migratory matters, the 
Egyptian regime has foregone the ‘more for more’ offer, going instead for a ‘less for less’ 
approach informed by a transactional logic (Bicchi, 2014; Völkel, 2014). 
On the other hand, in addition to strengthening relations with Gulf countries, the Sisi 
regime has concluded a range of sizeable commercial agreements with the main EU 
economies, with France the latest in line signing a deal worth over €2 billion in April 2016 
(Reuters, 2016). This follows in the trails of large investment contracts signed at the 2015 
Egypt Economic Development Conference (Al-Ahram, 2015). Through these methods, the 
Egyptian government has experienced a significant rise in FDI inflows (UNCTAD, 2016), but 
the more limited engagement with the EU means that it has not had – yet – to undergo the 
range of economic and financial sector reforms expected by the EU.  
In light of these developments, the persistence of the ordoliberal framing of security 
and stability despite the collapse of some of its presuppositions might help explain the 
limited success of the new ENP. While the Egyptian government has managed to centralise 
external relations and cooperate successfully on security and migration, these elements on 
their own are certainly not enough to guarantee the political stability on which economic 
security is supposed to be predicated. Indeed, significant rifts within the regime and in state-
society relations witness the fragility of the new order, which in turn makes investment less 
secure, as witnessed by deteriorating business conditions (Mada Masr, 2016). Additionally, 
the EU’s ordoliberal disposition appears to have been increasingly superseded by patronage 
arrangements with Gulf donors and lenders, thus also potentially jeopardising the EU 
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ontological security. Somewhat paradoxically, the recently agreed austerity programme, 
sponsored and financed by the IMF, appears to have been brokered not as much by the EU 
and the US, as in previous occasions, but rather directly by Gulf states (Ismail, 2016). 
This suggests that even more than in the past the Egyptian regime is able to feed back 
on how the EU sees security and stability. Indeed, one could argue what we see here is a 
form of ‘reverse diffusion’ (Cassarino, 2016), which – while not necessarily normative – 
undoubtedly affects the praxis of how the EU relates to Egypt. The re-emergence of more 
traditional security considerations, and the perceived ability of the Egyptian regime to 
deliver on them, appear to have forced the EU to redefining the security-stability nexus in 
more traditional terms, essentially accepting the new regime’s transactional approach.  
Thus, the new EU approach to promoting economic reforms in Egypt has amounted to 
inserting a stronger dimension of social engagement within the pre-existing ordoliberal 
template. However, the unwillingness of successive Egyptian governments to pursue this 
route appears to have led to even more exclusive engagement than in the past, together with 
a renewed emphasis on traditional security issues. This return of a more ‘realist’ conception 
of the security-stability nexus, also in the economic realm, holds significant implications for 
how the EU engages with Egypt. For one, the increasingly centralised management of 
external relations limits the EU ability to reach out to new local actors, thus undermining 
one of the dimensions of inclusiveness that the new ENP was meant to foster. Strengthened 
relations with emerging regional powers focusing less on policy conditionality in turn 
compound the increasing ineffectiveness of the EU’s use of discursive means of engagement, 
while simultaneously highlighting the EU inability to step up its material commitment, 
increasingly dwarfed by the resources poured by Gulf countries in the Egyptian economy.19 
Thus, while intended to be more comprehensive and inclusive, the EU’s post-Arab uprisings 
approach has in the case of economic reforms in Egypt led to less engagement, and of a 
lower quality, with a narrower range of actors. It should thus come as no surprise that the 
EU’s short-term influence on Egypt has declined sharply. 
 
Conclusion 
The EU tendency to promote in its neighbourhood reforms that have been perceived as 
successful internally appears to have survived in its economic relations with Egypt, 
irrespective of the dramatic transformations that the country has experienced since 2011. 
This has happened also in sectors where policy change would have been relatively uncostly, 
such as banking sector regulation. Indeed, with regard to economic reforms more broadly, in 
 15 
 
the post-Arab uprisings the EU appears to have gone one step further in promoting its 
ordoliberal version of restructuring, focused on gradualism and market-oriented regulation. 
The emphasis on corruption as the factor preventing reforms from having their intended 
effect, and funnelling their benefits in the hands of very few, has allowed the EU to embrace 
the demands of equality and social justice of the revolution, while turning them into the 
pursuit of ‘inclusive development’, but one still fundamentally intended in neoliberal terms. 
As a consequence, SMEs have increasingly become the target of EU programmes, but in a 
way that seeks to subordinate them to the old ordoliberal template, as discussed with 
reference to the EIB’s Risk Capital Facility. From the analytical perspective of this special 
issue, the incremental reinterpretation of the security-stability master frame in the economy 
has remained within the same ordoliberal parameters. Whereas this is undoubtedly partly 
because the EU still upholds the normative merits of this approach, it has also in no small 
measure to do with the belief that the pre-uprisings economic reforms carried out in Egypt 
under the EU sponsorship and supervision were seen as catering to the EU’s perceived 
interests. 
However, despite the declared intention to be more inclusive both in its methods and 
in sharing more broadly the promised benefits of reforms, the ordoliberal framing of the 
security-stability nexus in the economy in the wake of vastly changed circumstances has 
unintendedly led the EU towards even more selective engagement with Egyptian actors 
than under Mubarak. More specifically, the further centralisation of external relations under 
Sisi combined with the increased support provided by Saudi Arabia, UAE and Kuwait to the 
regime have crippled the EU ability to deliver on the objectives set out in the PfDSP and the 
new ENP. Rather, the EU’s reliance on the same discursive tropes of the past, accompanied 
by a stronger commitment to the use of conditionality, has made the EU a less appealing 
partner for the Sisi regime, particularly as the EU material support for Egypt is dwarfed by 
Gulf assistance and loans. In light of this, EU-Egypt relations have increasingly been 
channelled towards a transactional approach, with Sisi cooperating on the EU security 
agenda but stalling discussions on deeper economic cooperation, as demonstrated by the 
lack of progress on both DCFTA and the new Action Plan. 
In sum, the EU ability to influence Egypt’s economic policy decisions appears to have 
declined, at least in the short-run. However, this does not mean that the Egyptian economy 
has changed direction in any significant way, given the success of the Gulf states in nudging 
Sisi towards undertaking a new round of IMF-sponsored austerity and neoliberal reforms. 
In light of these developments, one can reasonably expect that the Egyptian economy will 
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increasingly be pulled towards the Gulf. In this regard, Sisi’s ability to strike commercial 
deals with individual member states while simultaneously dragging his heels on deeper 
economic cooperation with the EU might aggravate this tendency, as it provides lucrative 
opportunities for EU-based companies without much of an influence on economic policies 
and their implementation. It remains to be seen whether market size, the main weapon left 
in the EU’s armoury, will be enough to lure Egypt back towards deeper cooperation in the 
longer run. 
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Endnotes 
1 There are however notable exceptions. See for instance Martin (2004) and Holden (2009, 2010). 
2 It is well known that Egypt has a financial sector dominated by its banks, partly also because the 
capital market had largely been dormant until the early 1990s (Ikram, 2006; Roll, 2010). Thus, reforms 
to the banking sector are likely to affect both the structure and the performance of the overall financial 
sector. 
3 Interview, the then minister of investment, Cairo, July 2010. 
4 Interview, senior financial economist for the World Bank in the MENA region, Cairo, June 2010. 
5 In this respect, and following Ryner (2015: 281), ordoliberalism is conceived here as ‘a particular 
variant of neoliberalism’. 
6 In 2006, Intesa-San Paolo acquired an 80% equity stake in Bank of Alexandria (Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 2006). 
7 The central banks selected represented a mix of more and less developed EU member states, some 
already using the common currency and some still using a national currency. The members involved 
were Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Italy and Romania. 
8 Basel II, and the more recent Basel III, standards are designed by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (BCBS). These standards establish requirements concerning the amount of capital that a 
bank need to hold to safeguard itself against both financial and operational risks. In developing 
countries, the move towards implementing Basel II standards is often presented as an ‘upgrading’ of 
banking sector supervision. See instance on the CBE website: 
http://www.cbe.org.eg/en/BankingSupervision/Pages/Strategy.aspx.  
9 Interview, ECB resident programme coordinator, Cairo, June 2010. 
10 While the BCBS has broadened its membership over the last couple of decades, its regulations are 
still very much drafted according to the views and interests of the central bankers of the Group of 10, 
who established the Committee in 1975 (Ozgercin, 2012; Seabrooke ,2006). 
11 Interview, official from EU Delegation in Egypt, June 2010. 
12 The discussion papers on banking supervision are available on the CBE website: 
http://www.cbe.org.eg/en/BankingSupervision/Pages/AboutBaselRegulations.aspx.  
13 See: http://www.cbe.org.eg/en/BankingSupervision/Pages/ReformPhase2.aspx.  
14 See: http://www.cbe.org.eg/en/BankingSupervision/Pages/Strategy.aspx.  
15 Interview with ECB resident programme coordinator, Cairo, June 2010. 
16 This move towards simultaneously governing from a distance and increasingly shaping all aspects 
of social life is reminiscent of Foucault’s work on governmentality and biopolitics (Işleyen, 2015). 
With specific reference to economic reform promotion, the hypothesis of the EU as promoter of ‘post-
modern ordoliberalism’ has recently been advanced (Serres, 2016). 
17 See relevant page on the EIB website: http://www.eib.org/products/blending/rcfsn/index.htm. 
18 Apparently also through the use of off-balance sheet transactions directly into the army’s coffers, 
thus bypassing the CBE (Kingsley, 2015). 
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19 Within days of Morsi’s removal, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Kuwait had already committed $12 billion 
in support of the new army-led regime (Ravinsky, 2013). 
